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1.  A specter personified
At the end of 1747, when L’Homme machine began to circulate, the German 
philosophical scene was entering into a temporary truce in its long-lasting strug-
gle against materialism, at that point still considered the most harmful and the 
disgraceful expression of free-thinking. This situation concerned mainly that 
large part of Germany, which had remained almost uncontaminated by the new 
Francophile trend that animated the cultural enclave of Frederick’s court in 
Berlin. In fact, according to one of the most authoritative interpreters of 18th 
century German philosophy, “the French Enlightenment had surely caused some 
disturbance in Sanssouci, but its resonance in the surrounding German world 
remained limited”1. The publication of L’Homme machine, often described as 
a “monument of disgrace and ignominy”2, forced Germany to face once again 
the phantom of materialism, which now appeared in the form of a real danger in 
a well-delineated shape, no longer a vague, undefined, and somehow spectral 
threat. The degree of reality of the current menace of materialism was also in-
creased by the fact that the author of the book had been warmly welcomed at the 
Prussian court; L’Homme machine was not one of the usual phantomatic foreign 
dangers pressing up against the borders of the kingdom, but a real presence on 
German soil. Indeed up to that moment modern German philosophy had not 
experienced any significant and explicit profession of materialism, since its first 
clear defence goes back just to the 1770s, i.e. to Michael Hißmann’s Psycholo-
gische Versuche, and his brilliant synthesis of sensualistic ideas à la Condillac 
and the recent physiology inspired by Bonnet and Priestley3.
1 W. KRAUSS, Ein Akademiesekretär vor 200 Jahren: Samuel Formey, in ID., Studien zur deutschen und 
französischen Aufklärung, Rütten & Loening, Berlin 1963, p. 61.
2 Tablettes du clergé et des amis de la religion, 2 (1822), p. 181.
3 M. HISSMANN, Psychologische Versuche. Ein Beitrag zur esoterischen Logik, Helwing, Hannover-Göt-
tingen 1788 (17771). Cf. H.F. KLEMME / G. STIENING / F. WUNDERLICH (Hrsg.), Michael Hißmann (1752-
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Indeed the the forms of ‘pseudomaterialism’ that appeared in Germany between 
the 17th and the 18th century – for example with Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch, 
Theodor Ludwig Lau, or Gabriel Wagner – turned out to be the indirect and 
unavoidable consequence of the denial of any form of substance dualism, and 
of the reduction of the realm of reality to a general mechanical whole. Those 
kinds of reflections had a clear metaphysical commitment, and did not share 
much with the later project of understanding human nature solely by means of 
the physiology of the body4. Both of the two main struggles in Germany against 
the phantom of materialism – until the publication of L’Homme machine – were 
fought under the flag of Wolff’s philosophy. The first, which goes back to the 
conflict between Wolff and the Pietists in Halle in the early 1720s, had involved 
Wolff himself, who had been charged by Johann Franz Buddeus with promoting 
a form of fatalism by extending the principles of mechanical determinism from 
the realm of bodies to that of souls and ideas5. The connection between fatalism 
and materialism was pretty obvious6. The second struggle goes back to the early 
1740s, the time of the publication of the German translation of a spurious version 
of Voltaire’s XIII Philosophical Letter on thinking matter by the Berlin theologian 
Johann Gustav Reinbeck, who built his own refutation on the basis of Wolff’s 
rational psychology7. In both cases the materialistic approach – here understood 
in the sense of a ‘psychological’ materialism – was supported by a fundamental 
argument taken from Locke’s Essay, i.e. the impossibility of any reliable knowl-
edge of real essences. This impossibility allowed Wolff’s thesis concerning both 
the necessity of essence, and the connection between its attributes to be refuted, 
excluding therefore any form of fatalism, on the one hand; on the other hand, 
it allowed the hypothesis of thinking matter to be legitimated by ascribing the 
contradiction of the attributes of thought and extension to the boundaries of the 
human understanding, instead of introducing a suspicion of ‘weakness’ in God’s 
omnipotence. Wolff rejected Locke’s idea of the unknowability of real essences; 
he claimed that we cannot just know which attributes belong to the essences of 
1784). Ein materialistischer Philosoph der deutschen Aufklärung, de Gruyter, Berlin 2012; cf. P. RUMORE, 
Materia cogitans. L’Aufklärung di fronte al materialismo, Olms, Hildesheim 2013, cap. V.
4 In the past years the literature on these authors has increased significantly. For a first general bib-
liography cf. RUMORE, Materia cogitans cit., cap. I. On the Vertrauter Briefwechsel by U.G. BÜCHER cf. the 
paper by U. GOLDENBAUM in the present issue. On the relationship between mechanism and those forms of 
materialism cf. P. RUMORE, Mechanism and Materialism in Early Modern German Philosophy, in British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy (forthcoming).
5 Cf. RUMORE, Materia cogitans cit., cap. II.
6 On the materialistic grounds of Wolff’s fatalism cf. M. FAVARETTI CAMPOSAMPIERO, La chaîne des 
causes naturelles. Matérialisme et fatalisme chez Leibniz, Wolff et leurs adversaires, in Dix-huitième siècle, 
46 (2014), pp. 131-148. 
7 J.G. REINBECK, Philosophische Gedancken über die vernünfftige Seele und derselben Unsterblichkeit. 
Nebst einigen Anmerckungen über ein Frantzösiches Schreiben, darin behauptet werden will, daß die Ma-
terie dencke, Hauden, Berlin 1740 (reprint Olms, Hildesheim 2002). 
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things, but also that we can grasp their sufficient reason, i.e. the principle ac-
cording to which that particular thing has precisely those attributes, and not any 
other, excluding therefore any possible contradiction among them. In the very 
following years Georg Friedrich Meier, who shared with Wolff and Reinbeck the 
belief in both the logical and the ontological validity of the principle of sufficient 
reason, expressed the same conviction with these words: “God can create only 
possible beings. Omnipotence cannot produce thoughts in a compound being; it 
cannot endow matter neither with the faculty (Vermögen), nor with the capacity 
(Fähigkeit) of thinking”: omnipotence is “the faculty to make real all what is 
possible”, not even what is (logically, and therefore ontologically) impossible8. 
This obviously implied that because of their radical heterogeneity extension 
and thought cannot coexist in one and the same substance: being extended and 
composite, matter is passive and subject to movement; on the contrary thought is 
active, unextended and simple, and eludes any mechanical law that concerns the 
movement of bodies. This claim allowed conceiving human bodies as machines, 
but not the human being in its complexity. Indeed problems arose with the shift 
from the image of the body-a-machine to the one of the man-a-machine, viz. with 
the submission of human thoughts and actions to those mechanical laws that rule 
matter, i.e. with the denial of a dualist perspective in favor of a monism which 
leaves no place for any spiritual entity9.
The scandalous image of the man-a-machine – as it appeared in the title of 
La Mettrie’s book – started circulating in Germany impressively fast and with a 
very unique propulsive force. Not only the main philosophical and theological 
journals started to propagate rumors concerning L’Homme machine right after its 
publication, but the main authoritative voices of the German cultural scene, from 
Euler to Ploucquet, hastily printed out their refutations of what they considered 
the odd and harmful hypothesis of the materia cogitans. The presence of the 
image of the man-machine in one of the central works of the German Enlighten-
ment, i.e. in Johann Joachim Spalding’s Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des 
8 G.F. MEIER, Beweiß: daß keine Materie dencken könne, Hemmerde, Halle 1742, § 34. 
9 The image of the body-machine was widespread in the Wolffian realm of German philosophy, without 
any dangerous significance. Cf. for instance C. WOLFF, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und 
der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt (1720; henceforth, Deutsche Metaphysik), Olms, 
Hildesheim 1983, § 740; WOLFF, Von dem Begriff der Gesundheit (1729), in ID., Gesammelte kleine philo-
sophische Schrifften, welche besonders zu der Naturlehre gehören... (1736), Olms, Hildesheim 1981, § 2, p. 
341; G.F. MEIER, Beweis, daß die menschliche Seele ewig lebt, Hemmerde, Halle 1751 (2nd edition 1754), p. 
3: “ich stelle mir demnach einen Gottesacker als eine Werckstatt der Natur vor, wo sie die Ueberbleibsel 
der Menschen klüglich und sparsam zusammenstellt. Sie nimmt die Maschine des menschlichen Körpers 
an diesem Orte aus einander, und braucht sie zu dem Baue tausend anderer Körper, welche sie auf der 
Schaubühne dieses Erdbodens von neuem aufzustellen willens ist”. Problems seem to arise with the shift 
from the image of the body-machine to the man-machine, i.e. to the reduction of the man as a whole to 
the mechanical laws of matter. 
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Menschen (1748), and in what is commonly considered the manifesto of that era, 
Immanuel Kant’s Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784), counts 
as a further confirmation of the persistent impact of La Mettrie’s work on the 
German debate in the 18th century10. 
During the three decades that separate the publication of L’Homme machine 
from the flowering of Kantianism, German philosophy developed a stereotypi-
cal understanding of the image of the ‘man-machine’, which was in fact distant 
from La Mettrie’s own. The present paper focuses on the early moments of the 
breakthrough of the book in Germany, from the gradual discovery of the name of 
its author to the first prompt reactions against it, in order to try and understand 
the reasons that led to the birth and development of such a clichéd and, as we 
will see, almost unfounded misunderstanding. Considering the early reviews 
and refutations of L’Homme machine the paper attempts to show that the affaire 
La Mettrie itself can be seen as a case of the persistent hegemony of Wolffian-
ism, whose ideas – even if at that point less present than in the two previous 
decades – kept on working as an inescapable filter promoting the circulation of 
some convictions, and preventing the transmission of others. German philosophy 
read L’Homme machine right away through Wolff’s spectacles, encouraging the 
development of a misleading opinion on the nature of its materialism, without 
the latter ever being reconsidered. 
2.  Wolff facing “les esprits forts”
On January 2nd 1748 Wolff, at that point back in Halle again where he was at-
tending to the conclusion of the series of his Latin works, asked his close corre-
spondent and friend Ernst Christoph Count of Manteuffel some information on a 
“certain French treatise concerning the man-machine” he had heard some rum-
ors about11. Once Manteuffel received Wolff’s request, he set his active network 
10 C. SCHWAIGER, Zur Frage nach den Quellen von Spaldings “Bestimmung des Menschen”. Ein un-
gelöstes Rätsel der Aufklärungsforschung, in N. HINSKE (Hrsg.), Die Bestimmung des Menschen, Meiner, 
Hamburg 1999 (Aufklärung, vol. 11), pp. 7-19. P. RUMORE, Kant’s Understanding of the Enlightenment 
with Reference to his Refutation of Materialism, in Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philos-
ophy, 1 (2014), pp. 80-95.
11 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 2nd 1748 (nr. 414), in Historisch-kritische Edition des Brief-
wechsels zwischen Christian Wolff und Ernst Christoph Graf von Manteuffel, K. MIDDELL / H.-P. NEUMANN 
(eds.), URL = http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-106475, pp. 152-154. A partial repro-
duction of the correspondence (limited to the letters that were philosophically relevant) was already 
published at the beginning of the 20th century by H. OSTERTAG, Der philosophische Gehalt des Wolff-Man-
teuffelschen Briefwechsels, Quelle & Mayer, Leipzig 1910 (reprod. Olms, Hildesheim, 1980). On the new 
edition we referred to in this paper cf. H.-P. NEUMANN, “Verharre in aller ersinnlichen Submission” – 
Die Korrespondenz Christian Wolffs und das Vorhaben der historisch-kritischen Edition des Briefwechsels 
 In Wolff’s Footsteps. The Early German Reception of La Mettrie’s L’Homme machine 99
into action in order to provide his friend with the infamous book, which seemed 
to have reawakened one of Wolff’s deepest ambitions, i.e. the struggle against 
any form of Profanität regardless of their different external manifestations such 
as deism, skepticism, materialism or freethinking in general. A huge part of 
the decade-long correspondence between the two friends is occupied by Wolff’s 
complaining about the harmfulness of those philosophical deviations and by his 
ideas concerning the best way to encourage the natural and spontaneous attitude 
towards truth in the human mind. By means of Manteuffel, the “highest defender 
of his philosophy”, and of his “Society of Alethophiles” Wolff meant to promote 
his own ideas up to a level of publicity they could not reach otherwise12. Indeed, 
as the founder of that Society, originally conceived as the proper instrument of 
dissemination of Wolffianism, Manteuffel acted for over a decade as director and 
medium of a widespread network of admirers of Wolff’s philosophy, promoting a 
prompt spread of Wolff’s works and gospel and, last but not least, contributing 
in a very massive way to the penetration of those ideas in the German culture 
until the late 1740s.
Wolff and Manteuffel shared the same negative opinion concerning the Berlin 
philosophical scene. Both of them complained bitterly about the “well-known 
situation of our times”, when “especially in Berlin people incline even too much 
towards the free-thinking (libertinage)” of the esprit forts and of naturalists; in-
deed those thinkers seemed “to gain more and more ground remarkably in Ger-
many, where only a few people are able to read their works cum grano salis”13. 
Wolff held a precise opinion concerning the gradual barbarization of German 
philosophy, the popularity of freethinking and of materialism as its worst mani-
festation. In a letter written in April 1739 he complained to his friend Manteuffel 
about this circumstance, developing a sort of genealogy of such a disgraceful 
philosophical trend. According to Wolff the very first germs of the modern mate-
rialistic aberration came from England via Hobbes and Locke, where they orig-
zwischen Christian Wolff und Ernst Christoph Graf von Manteuffel, in E. JOST / D. FULDA (Hrsg.), Korres-
pondenznetzwerke der Aufklärung, Kleine Schriften des IZEA, vol. 4, Halle 2012.
12 The first letter of the correspondence between Wolff and Manteuffel, May 11 1738 (nr. 1), p. 1: 
“Euer Hochgräfl. Excellenz haben sich bisher als den grösten Beschützer meiner Philosophie erwiesen”; 
Manteuffel’s reply is on May 16 1738 (nr. 2), p. 3 (from Berlin): “vous m’avez instruit et m’instruisez 
journellement par vos savans ècrits [...] Les veritez que vous m’avez fait connoitre, et que vòtre present 
me met en ètat d’approfondir encore mieux, sont si inestimables, que tout ce que je possede n’en egaleroit 
pas le prix”. On the Society of the Alethophiles, and in general on Manteuffel’s role in the dissemination of 
Wolffianism cf. J. BRONISCH, Der Mäzen der Aufklärung. Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel und das Netzwerk 
des Wolffianismus, de Gruyter, Berlin 2010.
13 The quotations are from: Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, Dec. 11 1746 (nr. 292), p. 232; Manteuffel’s 
letter to Wolff, Dec. 9 1746 (nr. 291), pp. 231-232; Manteuffel’s letter to Wolff, Dec. 19-20 1746 (nr. 295), 
pp. 238-239.
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inated from the various disastrous attempts to translate Newton’s mathematical 
genius in philosophicis.
“The British were wrong in confusing the imaginaria, which are very useful in math-
ematics, and realia of metaphysics and physics, which should instead be carefully 
distinguished from the first. [...] Those are again the outcomes of Hobbes and of Locke, 
who [Locke] inculcated materialism in a pleasant way (unter einem angenehmen ve-
hiculo) in those who want to be successful taking advantage of others, avoiding the 
hard work of the proper use of their understanding, and putting their imagination and 
senses at a disadvantage”14.
In Wolff’s reconstruction, combining the weakness of their method in phi-
losophy with a good dose of arrogance, British esprits forts provided a mixture 
of Pyrrhonism and deism which turned out to be a danger even for that kind of 
religion, the natural one, they originally intended to safeguard. Once oriented in 
that materialistic direction British philosophy crossed the Channel, and became 
responsible for the current disastrous situation of French philosophy: “England 
corrupted France”, and “that’s why even in France philosophy is now in a very 
bad condition. Those who want to move some steps further stick to Descartes, 
whereas some others stay with Locke. In this way, skepticism and deism triumph 
among the learned people in Paris”15. Actually the process of contamination 
concerned the whole of Central Europe16; indeed freethinkers set up swiftly 
in Germany, and especially in Prussia where they found their most impudent 
bulwark17.
As mentioned above, the awareness of being at the head of a real philosoph-
ical ‘mission’ for the sake of common sense (gesunder Menschenverstand) had 
already animated Wolff in the years of his controversy with the theologians in 
14 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, April 19 1739 (nr. 22), p. 45.
15 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, April 19 1939 (nr. 22), pp. 46-47: “In Frankreich ist die Philosophie 
auch noch in einem sehr schlechten Zustande. Die weit gehen wollen, hangen an dem Cartesio. Einige 
bleiben bey dem Locke. Und daher hat in Paris unter den grösten Gelehrten der Scepticismus und De-
ismus die Oberhand“.
16 According to Wolff Italy warmly welcomed his philosophy as an antidote to scepticism and material-
ism: “Erst mit letzterer Post habe von einem guten Freunde vernommen, daß der Portugiesische Minister 
in Rom P. Evora, bey dem ich so wohl angeschrieben, als nur möglich, ihm diese Ursache gesagt, warum 
insonderheit bey der hohen Geistlichkeit und anderen gelehrten Theologi meine Philosophie in Italien in 
so großes Ansehen kommen, als er in andern auswärtigen Ländern noch nicht gefunden. Es wäre nemlich 
durch die principia der heutigen berühmten Engelländer der Materialismus und Scepticismus in Italien 
überall gewaltig eingerißen. Man hätte sich nicht im stande gefunden aus der Scholastischen Philosophie 
demselben zu begegnen. Daher hätte man sich mit Macht auf meine Philosophie legen müßen, weil man 
darinnen die Waffen gefunden, dadurch man diese Monstra bestreiten und besiegen kan” (Wolff ’s letter 
to Manteuffel, June 7 1739, nr. 30). 
17 Cf. P. CASINI, Newton in Prussia, in Rivista di Filosofia, 91 (2000), pp. 251-282; on the German 
reception of the French Enlightenment cf. P.-E. KNABE, Die Rezeption der französischen Aufklärung in den 
“Göttingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen” (1739-1779), Klostermann, Frankfurt 1978.
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Halle; at the end of his long career the encounter with La Mettrie’s materialism 
reawoke in him the very same vocation. But by 1748 Wolff was an old man who 
had gone through the tormented affaire of the condemnation of his writings, of 
the banishment from his Halle, and of the many controversies with his persecu-
tors; it was highly probable that by that time, he had not the slightest intention 
of committing himself personally in a strenuous dispute against freethinkers. 
The time of the virulent crossfire with Buddeus was over; Wolff’s attitude was 
now different:
“By means of confiscation, refutation, and banishment one doesn’t manage to combat 
evil. If the youth is not raised in a proper way in schools and universities, and if the 
older ones are not models for the younger, in particular if churchmen are not models 
for common people, all the rest will be in vain. [...] I think that I provide something 
useful by keeping on working on my writings, instead of using my time to refute today’s 
freethinkers”18.
Once he came in contact with La Mettrie’s new defense of materialism his 
reaction was far from tepid, and following his request, Manteuffel’s personal 
secretary Christian Gottlieb Spener delivered in a few days a copy of the in-
criminated book to Halle. Nevertheless Wolff seemed to have gathered a precise 
opinion of the book even before having flipped through it; in his eyes it repre-
sented yet another defense of materialism developed in the way free-thinkers do, 
i.e. by means of principles that seem evident to those who haven’t yet learnt how 
to think thoroughly (gründlich). It has to be seen if the author has the skills of 
Hobbes and of his British followers, since the French fickle spirit (der Frantzö-
sische Fladder-Geist) appreciates only what fits the senses, considering all the 
rest excessively arid and inane19. 
Manteuffel basically agreed with Wolff’s first impression, and didn’t hesitate 
to call that peculiar expression of free-thought by its proper name; indeed he 
thought he could recognize in the book the same ideas and the arguments Vol-
taire had expressed in “a certain letter written to demonstrate that matter can 
think”, the one that Reinbeck had “solidement refutée” by means of the princi-
18 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 2 1748 (nr. 414), p. 153. The same idea can be found also 
in a previous letter (Dec. 29 1947, nr. 412) where Wolff claimed: “Die Confiscation der Bücher macht 
insgemein, daß die Menschen begieriger darnach werden, und je unartiger sich der Autor aufführet, je 
mehr wil ein jeder einen solchen raren Schatz haben, und ob ihn gleich nur wenige theuer bezahlen, so 
communiciret doch ein Besitzer deßelben ihn desto mehreren, wodurch er bekandter wird, als wenn man 
ihn vor einige groschen hätte haben können, da man als eine gemeine und ungereimte Sache ein solches 
Buch würde verachtet haben” (p. 150). Cf. also Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, Nov. 2 1748 (nr. 486), p. 266.
19 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 2 1748 (nr. 414), p. 154.
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ples of Wolff’s rational psychology20. The two friends had a predominantly bad 
opinion of Frederick’s favourite advisor, considering him to irreparably lack 
stable principles, with a clear inclination towards materialism, skepticism, and 
atheism21. 
On January 14th, just three days after having received the book, Wolff an-
nounced to his friend that he was ready to return back the copy he had on loan. 
After this first lightning but careful reading Wolff was able to conjecture about 
the paternity of the work; according to him the author could have easily been 
a certain Kuenz (Caspar Cuenz or Gaspard Cuentz, or Künz, 1676-1752), the 
Swiss State Counselor in Saint-Gall, and member of the Académie des Sciences 
et Belles Lettres in Marseilles, who was well known to Wolff as the author of 
four volumes in octavo on materialism. L’Homme machine seemed to fit perfectly 
the scope of presenting the same ideas in a much shorter and more manageable 
compendium, probably according to the advice by the Marquis d’Argens, who 
was notoriously engaged in the affaire22. The monumental work by Cuenz Wolff 
was referring to was published in Neuchâtel by the Imprimerie des éditeurs du 
Journal hélvétique in 1742 with the title Essai d’un Système nouveau concernant 
la nature des êtres spirituels en partie sur les principes du célèbre Mr. Locke, philos-
ophe anglois dont l’auteur fait l’apologie. Actually the ‘apprentice’ philosopher 
Cuenz shared with the author of L’Homme machine a clear apologetic inclination 
towards Locke, as well as a just as much clear aversion for the metaphysics of 
monads. Nevertheless – and it should probably have made Wolff suspicious – he 
attempted to reconcile his radical metaphysical materialism with the principles 
of Christianity. By stating that God’s immateriality was nothing but a mere chi-
mera, and the unextended substance a pure ens rationis, Cuenz stood as the pal-
adin of a new alliance between philosophy and religion which aimed at silencing 
the reprisals of the esprit forts23. According to Wolff’s general view Cuenz’s mate-
20 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 11 1748 (nr. 415), p. 155. The original title of the so-called 
Epistula gallica (French letter) was: Copie d’un Manuscript ou l’on soutient que c’est la matiére qui pense; 
cf. supra fn. 7. On Reinbeck’s refutation cf. RUMORE, Materia cogitans cit., pp. 121-128. Differently from 
Manteuffel – who was actually writing a private letter and not taking part in a public debate – Reinbeck 
was very prudent in ascribing the letter to Voltaire, despite its clear proximity to his so-called Letter on 
Locke in the English Letters. 
21 Manteuffel’s letter to Wolff, June 15 1739 (nr. 33), p. 75: “Voltaire, luy mème, est un homme qui n’a 
aucun principe fixe. Son genie plus vaste que solide; soutenu d’une Philautie demesurèe, et d’un desir 
outrè de passer pour un esprit universel et superieur; le porte cependant à embrasser et à soutenir avec 
vivacité les opinions les plus extraordinaires. Etant de ce gout là, il ne faut pas ètre surpris, qu’il donne, à 
corps perdu, dans le Materialisme et le Scepticisme, ne cachant pas mème á ses confidens, qu’il est Athèe. 
Jl est d’ailleurs d’une humeur turbulente, inegale, emportèe, mordante, et tellement livrè á la vilainie, á 
la debauche la plus infame, et a tout ce qui est le plus opposè à la probitè, et á la sagesse, qu’il n’y a que 
la crainte des supplices qui l’empeche de professer ouvertement la sceleratesse”.
22 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 18 1748 (nr. 418), pp. 159-160.
23 The role of Cuenz in the German scene of the time was not the most central, but also not marginal 
at all. With his dissertation on monads (Dissertation qui a remporté le prix proposé par l’Académie royale 
 In Wolff’s Footsteps. The Early German Reception of La Mettrie’s L’Homme machine 103
rialism went back to the time he spent in Paris, where that philosophical attitude 
seemed to be “so common among the learned people” that “every member of the 
Academie des sciences and of the Academie des inscriptions and belles lettres 
are nothing but deists” (p. 157). In effect Wolff considered the path that leads 
from deism to materialism to be short and pre-set: “it moves from Spinozism and 
ends up in the materialism itself” (ibidem), the latter being a sly mixture of the 
deistic mistake (the denial of divine providence), and of Spinoza’s erroneous idea 
that God is as much extended as material and composite bodies24. The claims 
of L’Homme machine followed unsurprisingly from those premises: there is no 
other being than material being; humans and animals differ only by means of 
the degree of their physical organization; the different terms we use to indicate 
the faculties of the soul are nothing but empty words which designate the faculty 
of imagination and the brain as its ‘laboratory’; the soul doesn’t exist at all, nor 
does the odd artificial harmony that seeks to explains the commercium between 
mind and body; every psychical process can be reduced to the mechanismum 
corporis and to cerebral modifications that produce thoughts and appetites. The 
conclusion was the identification of the ‘true philosopher’ with the physician, 
who deals only with the mechanical functioning of the material body; it implied a 
profound disregard towards the explorers of the depths of the soul, and even more 
des sciences et belles lettres sur le Système des Monades avec les pièces qui ont concouru, Hande und Spener, 
Berlin 1748) he managed to enter the philosophical debate, and to enter in contact with the main represen-
tatives of the Berlin Academy, from Maupertuis to Formey. Cf. A. THOMSON, Un marginal de la république 
des sciences: Caspar Cuenz, in Dix-huitième siècle, 40 (2008), pp. 29-42; C. BORGHERO, Spiriti estesi e 
corpi animati. La metafisica di Cuenz tra Newton e Diderot, in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, XCI 
(XCIII) (2012), pp. 324-339; A. THOMSON, L’Ame des Lumières. Le débat sur l’être humain entre religion et 
science: Angleterre-France (1690-1760), Champ Vallon, Paris 2013, pp. 232-237. A further confirmation 
of Cuenz’s uninterrupted activity of self-promotion can be found in the correspondence between Wolff 
and Manteuffel: Wolff tells his correspondent he has just received from Cuenz “ein Plan von einem neuen 
Systemate von dem Ursprunge, der Erzeugung und Natur des Menschen” – the same précis of the “essai 
sur la formation, la propagation et la nature de l’être humain” Cuenz had already sent to Euler (THOMSON, 
Un marginal de la république des sciences cit., p. 37). Claiming that Cuenz was the real author of L’Homme 
machine Wolff asks Manteuffel to forward it to Kästner (at that time still close to Wolff’s philosophy) in 
order to hear his opinion on it (Wolff ’s letter to Menteuffel, July 13 1748, nr. 448, p. 204; Manteuffel’s letter 
to Wolff, July 16 1748, nr. 449, p. 205; Manteuffel’s letter to Wolff, July 22 1748, nr. 452, pp. 209-210, 
with a report on Kästner’s opinion on the précis, that Wolff will judge “gemäß seiner durchdringenden 
Einsicht und gewöhnlichen Überlegung”, Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, July 26 1748, nr. 455, p. 213, and 
Manteuffel’s reply of July 30 1748, nr. 457, p. 216) .
24 According to Wolff (cf. Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars posterior, Renger, 
Francofurti et Lipsiae 1737, reprint Olms, Hildesheim 1980, § 529) “Deista [...] dicitur, qui Deum existere 
concedit, eum tamen res humanas curare negat, seu providentiam divinam negat. Unde Deismus in nega-
tione providentiae Numinis consistit, cujus existentia admittitur” (cf. G. GAWLICK, Christian Wolff und der 
Deismus, in Christian Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen zu seiner Philosophie und deren Wirkung, Meiner, 
Hamburg 1983, pp. 129-138; and ID., art. “Deismus”, in J. RITTER / K. GRÜNDER (Hrsg.), Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Schwabe, Basel and Stuttgart 1971 ff.). On Spinoza’s mistake: WOLFF, Theo-
logia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars posterior cit., §§ 689-694: § 692: “Spinoza errat, dum 
extensionem Dei esse attributum, sive Deum esse rem extensam contendit”.
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towards the theologians – a disregard that according to Wolff and Manteuffel the 
anonymous author shared with Johann Christian Edelmann, on whose dramatic 
destiny they had commented at length25. Like Edelmann, every materialist is at 
the same time godless and Spinozist: he has “no other God than Nature, and [...] 
he assumes there is a seule substance diversement modifiée”26. 
According to Wolff this kind of materialism was nothing more and nothing 
less than the old idea of reducing substance to merely passive matter ruled by 
mechanical principles. It was once again the reproduction of the same old story; 
in about one century materialism had not been able to move one step further. It 
was actually still at the same point where Hobbes left it, being a form of meta-
physical and mechanical monism where inert matter was conceived in terms of 
extension (shape, size and motion), and the only kind of activity originated in 
a principle of movement coming from outside27. After all, Wolff’s metaphysical 
conception was fundamentally Cartesian, and any form of materialism appeared 
in his eyes as an undue mutilation of dualism.
Considering the question from this rigid perspective, Wolff was not able to 
grasp the peculiarity of La Mettrie’s materialism – a peculiarity that in fact La 
Mettrie himself had contributed to keep out of sight by hinting already in the title 
of his work at a possible Cartesian legacy. In his materialism matter was much 
more than bare extension. His system embodied a form of modern Epicureanism 
according to which matter has an immanent active principle; it consists in the 
composition of atoms, or molecules conceived as portions of living matter28. The 
25 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 14 1748 (nr. 417), p. 158. The reference is to J.C. EDEL-
MANN, Abgenöthigtes Jedoch Andern nicht wieder aufgenöthigtes Glaubens-Bekentniß (1746), in Sämtli-
che Schriften in Einzelausgaben, ed. by Walter Grossmann, frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 
1969-1987, vol. IX, followed by J.P. SÜSSMILCH’s reply, Die Unvernunft und Bosheit des berüchtigten Edel-
manns durch seine schändliche Vorstellung des Obrigkeitlichen Amts aus seinen Moses dargethan und zu 
aller Menschen Warnung vor Augen gelegt, Haude und Spener, Berlin 1747, and again by EDELMANN’s, 
Schuldigstes Danksagungs-Schreiben an den Herrn Probst Süßmilch vor Dessen, Ihm unbewußt erzeigte 
Dienste (1747), in Sämtliche Schriften in Einzelausgaben cit., vol. XI. On Edelmann cf. E. SCHEWELEIT, 
Johann Christian Edelmann – Repräsentant der radikalen Aufklärung, in W. FÖRSTER (ed.), Aufklärung 
in Berlin, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1989, pp. 279-315; R. OTTO, Johann Christian Edelmann’s Criticism 
of the Bible and its Relation to Spinoza, in W. VAN BUNGE / W.N.A. KLEVER (eds.), Disguised and Overt 
Spinozism around 1700, Brill, Leiden 1996, pp. 171-188; E. WALRAVENS, Johann Christian Edelmann’s 
Radicalism: A Synthesis of Enlightenment and Spirituality, in Philosophica, 89 (2014), pp. 137-178.
26 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 29 1748 (nr. 420), p. 162; even though “Edelmann hat nur 
weniger Verstand und politesse, als der in frantzösischem Habit eingekleidete vorgegebene Schweitzer” 
(Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 29 1748 [nr. 420], p. 162). 
27 WOLFF, Deutsche Metaphysik cit., § 627 where there is a caveat concerning the possible confusion 
of the two concepts; matter is pure passivity, since it can oppose resistence (§ 622), whereas the body is 
also active i.e., capable of changing its own state (§§ 623-624). Cf. also § 607 and § 626. On the same 
topic cf. WOLFF, Der vernünfftigen Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen 
Dingen überhaupt, Anderer Theil (1724, 1740), Olms, Hildesheim 1983 (henceforth “Anmerkungen zur 
deutschen Metaphysik”), §§ 228 f. 
28 Cf. C.T. WOLFE, A happiness fit for organic bodies: La Mettrie’s medical Epicureanism, in N. LEDDY 
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idea that the principle of movement did not lie in an external impulse acting on 
the ‘disposition’ of material elements, like in Descartes’s physics, but directly 
in the ‘organization’ of matter itself, is what allowed the shift from the old me-
chanical perspective to the new non-mechanical one. According to La Mettrie 
“organised matter is endowed with a motive principle (principe moteur), which 
is the only thing distinguishing it from unorganised matter […]; and everything 
that happens in animals, and everything that makes one animal unlike another, 
arises from differences in how they are organised”; “everything depends upon 
how our machine is wound up (tout dépend de la manière dont nostre Machine est 
montée)”29. But it was precisely Wolff’s erroneous opinion, i.e. the result of his 
historical and theoretical bias against materialism, that was the real filter that 
would prejudice the reception of La Mettrie in Germany.
3.  Wolff’s armed branch
Wolff obtained some reliable information about the identity of the author of 
L’Homme machine just at the end of January, and oddly enough not via Man-
teuffel and his active network in the République des lettres, but via the Secret 
Counselor von Bielefeld who was sent from Berlin to Halle on a diplomatic mis-
sion. From him Wolff learnt that a French and not a Swiss physician, a certain 
“Lametrie”, who was compelled to leave France because of the charge of impiety 
and atheism, was the author of the ignominious book30. With unusual haste Wolff 
wrote to Manteuffel about the piece of news coming from Berlin31. Impressed 
by such an enthusiastic involvement, Manteuffel decided to act out one of his 
most successful strategies in the dissemination of Wolff’s ideas; he planned the 
publication of a review – actually an ‘extract’ according the usage of the time 
/ A.S. LIFSCHITZ (eds.), Epicurus in the Enlightenment, Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 2009, pp. 69-83: 
pp. 74-77. On the distance between La Mettrie’s position and the Cartesian model of mechanism cf. 
A. VARTANIAN, La Mettrie’s l’Homme Machine: A Study in the Origins of an Idea, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 1960, pp. 18-24; A. THOMSON, Materialism and Society in the mid-eighteenth Century: La 
Mettrie’s “Discours préliminaire”, Droz, Gèneve 1981, pp. 40-46; ID., Bodies of Thought. Science, Religion, 
and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment, Oxford University Press, New York 2008, ch. 6; K. WELLMANN, 
La Mettrie: Medicine, Philosophy, and Enlightenment, Duke University Press Books, Durham-London 
1992, pp. 170-186. 
29 J.O. DE LA METTRIE, L’Homme machine (1747), in ID., Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by F. Markovits, 
Fayard, Paris 1987, vol. 1, p. 109 and p. 71; cf. also p. 112: “Thought is so far from being incompatible 
with organized matter that it seems to me to be just another of its properties, such as electricity, the motive 
faculty, impenetrability, extension, etc.”.
30 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, January 30 1748 (nr. 422), p. 166. Wolff considered his source of 
information very reliable, since the Secret Counseler von Bielefeld had chance to examine directly La 
Mettrie’s correspondence with the people at Frederick’s court (Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, February 12 
1748 [nr. 428], p. 175).
31 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, February 4 1748 (nr. 424), p. 169. 
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– in a proper Wolffian tone32. Wolff, who had no intention to get into a public 
quarrel with such an obscure figure, welcomed warmly Manteuffel’s sugges-
tion to commission the refutation of those materialistic oddities to some faithful 
representative of the Society of the Alethophiles. Within a few days Manteuffel 
forwarded Wolff’s annotations, as well as the invitation to write a review of the 
book to Karl Andreas Bel (1717-1782), by that time extraordinary professor of 
Philosophy and librarian at the University of Leipzig, who had been introduced 
to Wolff as a “très zélé partisan de votre Philosophie”33. On February 9th Wolff 
was already sending back the revised drafts of Bel’s text, carefully corrected and 
integrated34. This episode prepares the actual reception of La Mettrie in Germa-
ny, since the Histoire naturelle de l’âme was actually rediscovered only after the 
scandal generated by L’Homme machine. Wolff’s aim in this campaign was unam-
biguous; the presentation of the thesis of La Mettrie’s book had to be preceded by 
detailed information about the identity and the recent past of his author in order 
to warn the readers. L’Homme machine was nothing other than one of the worse 
effects of the moral and cultural corruption that the Prussian court welcomed so 
warmly35. According to Wolff’s (correct) conjectures La Mettrie came to Berlin 
by means of the recommendation of his compatriot Maupertuis36, whose power 
at the Prussian court was mysteriously accompanied by an embarrassing intel-
lectual poverty37. Indeed the offer of hosting the ‘Man-machine’ matched the 
32 Manteuffel’s letter to Wolff, January 29/30 1748 (nr. 421), p. 164: “Vos reflexions sur l’Homme-Ma-
chine, je viens de les communiquer au prof. Bel, qui est venu passer la soirée avec moi, et qui en fera 
peutétre usage, dans un ample extrait, qu’il s’est proposé de faire de ce petit traité”; cf. Manteuffel’s letter 
to Wolff, February 6 1748 (nr. 425), p. 171.
33 Manteuffel’s letter to Wolff, July 5 1747 (nr. 339), p. 38.
34 Manteuffel’s letter to Wolff, February 6 1748 (nr. 425), p. 171; Wolff’s reply on February 9 1748 (nr. 
427), p. 173, and the request of integrations in a post-scriptum in Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, February 12 
1748 (nr. 428), p. 175.
35 Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, February 12 1748 (nr. 428), p. 175. Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, February 
20 1748 (nr. 430), p. 177. 
36 Maupertuis was born in Saint Malo too. Wolff’s letter to Manteuffel, March 25 1748 (nr. 439), p. 
192. Cf. Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, February 29 1748 (nr. 432), pp. 180-181. On the intellectual closeness 
between Maupertuis and La Mettrie Wolff will write again some months later: “M.[aupertuis] ist nicht 
allein ein guter Freund von dem L’Homme machine, sondern auch mit ihm einerley Sinnes. Daher nicht 
zu verwundern, wenn er eine jenem anständige Sprache führet”: Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, September 
8 1748, nr. 469, p. 233.
37 On Wolff’s and Manteuffel’s disdain towards Maupertuis cf. their consideration concerning the 
prize essay competition on monads at the Royal Academy in Berlin: “Es würde auch sehr dienlich seyn, 
wenn die lateinische Schrifft dem Praesidenten Maupertuis in die Hände könnte gespielet werden, weil 
er von den deutschen Schrifften nichts lesen kan, und, wie ich leicht voraussehen kan, diese Schrifft so 
eingerichtet seyn wird, daß sie einem Frantzosen angenehm zu lesen, dem die trockene Wahrheit nicht 
nach seinem Geschmack ist, sondern bey dem ein bon-mot mehr gielt, als alle gründliche Ausführung” 
(Wolff ’s letter to Manteuffel, November 8 1747, nr. 397, pp. 127-128). On September 26 1748, Wolff 
repeated to his friend once again the real grounds of his scorn for what Manteuffel will call “l’érudition 
limitée” of Maupertuis (Manteuffel’s letter to Wolff, September 29 1748, nr. 478, p. 248): according to 
Wolff the Academy in Berlin will suffer from his departure not only because “sie nicht wieder einen Mann 
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private interests of both the powerful persons of the court; Maupertuis managed 
to offer a safe asylum to his compatriot compelled to leave not only France, but 
also the Netherlands; Fredrick the Great managed to show to the entire world 
that the practice of tolerance in his kingdom was really unlimited – an aim he 
seemed to care much more about than of the freedom of thought and expression 
of the disgraceful persecuted physicians38.
Bel’s review appeared anonymously in the Neue Zeitungen von Gelehrten Sa-
chen in Leipzig on February 22nd, 1748. Both the general opinion on the book, 
and the specific objections go directly back to Wolff. The criticism concerned 
basically three points: the idea that one could derive the complete identity of 
mental and physical states from their simultaneous occurrence; the idea that an 
organized body could be endowed with the capacity of thinking; the idea that 
thought and sensation can derive from movement, provided that every single 
corporeal fiber has its own principle of motion. In general Bel concluded his 
review with a quotation of Wolff’s verdict: L’Homme machine was nothing but an 
“old molding dish now served in a French sauce that is not even spicy enough 
to cover its bad smell”39.
4.  In Wolff’s footsteps
The idea that L’Homme machine was more a kind of odd and obsolete story than 
a real danger was not new at all. It was part of the general reaction of Germany 
to the triviality of the theses and arguments of the new philosophical attitude 
von gleicher einsicht zum Praesidenten bekommen könnte, sondern weil nicht leicht einer wieder so viel 
Credit bey dem Könige haben würde, der das utile der Academie wie er befördern könnte, und dem sich 
in seinen in dieser absicht gethanenen Vorschlägen niemand zu wiedersprechen unterstehen dörffte, und 
Gegenvorstellungen zu machen” (nr. 477, p. 246).
38 Cf. W. DILTHEY, Friedrich der Grosse und die deutsche Aufklärung, in ID., Gesammelte Schriften. 
Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes, vol. 3.6, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992 (1901), 
pp. 116-117. Frederick asked Maupertuis to select some hommes de lettres of the French environment 
in order to introduce the new philosophical trend in the court in Berlin. Frederick promised La Mettrie 
optimal work conditions and a full freedom of thought and expression. Nevertheless the real situation La 
Mettrie found in Berlin was deeply different: Voltaire himself revealed La Mettrie’s complaining about his 
condition in Prussia. Cf. THOMSON, Materialism and Society in the mid-eighteenth Century cit., pp. 11-12.
39 Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen, 16 (February 22 1748), pp. 138-141: p. 141: “ein altes und 
verdorbenes Gerichte mit einer Französichen Brühe wieder aufgetragen; diese ist aber nicht so stark 
gewürzt, daß man jenes davor nicht mercken sollte”. Cf. also Formey’s opinion on the book he had just 
received: “Nous avons un petit livre, qui fait quelque bruit ici, sour le titre de l’Homme Machine. Ce 
n’est au fonds qu’une repetition de choses qui ont été cent fois dites, et cent fois réfutées” (December 
26 1747, quoted from H. OSTERTAG, Der philosophische Gehalt des Wolff-Manteuffelschen Briefwechsels 
(1910), reprint Olms, Hildesheim 1980, p. 164). Cf. also the article in the Göttingische Zeitungen von 
Gelehrten Sachen, 25 (March 1748), pp. 260-262, concerning the review of L’Homme machine published 
in the new Nachrichten einer hallischen Bibliothek: “Aus diesen wird man erweisen, daß die neuen Feinde 
des Glaubens nichts neues hervorgebracht haben” (p. 260). 
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coming from France. This idea was already in the criticism of some other reac-
tions that came out a few weeks before Bel’s review, first of all in the Göttingi-
sche Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen edited by Albrecht von Haller (December 
1747)40, and in the Nachrichten von einer hallischen Bibliothek edited by the 
Halle theologian Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (January 1748)41. Especially the 
latter offered a very clear proof of the image people had in Germany of the new 
French ‘philosophical trend’: he criticized “the by-now widespread manner of 
handling not only philosophy, but also other sciences and the whole realm of 
knowledge in a funny and witty way (lustig und witzig)”, the charlatanism of 
those sharp free-spirits (scharfsinninge Freigeister) who consider themselves 
freethinkers “only because of their weird (sonderbar) opinions they consider 
new and outrageous, and because they reject principles which are common-
sensical and have been repeatedly proved” (pp. 83-84). L’Homme machine was 
the perfect expression of that intellectual degeneration: it was nothing but the 
“abortion of a physician, a bad copy of the Histoire de l’âme and of the Pensèe phi-
losophiques ascribed to Diderot [...]; it aims at questioning the existence of God, 
of the cult, of the highest beatitude, of the survival of the soul after death”. And 
it did it in a very awkward way: “its weapons are trimmed reeds and bad assorted 
undergrowth; its concepts empty words, and its demonstrations witty but insane 
tricks [...]; therefore no one has to fear that this work can be of any damage”42. 
Once Bel’s review was published the identity of the author of the scandalous 
book was no longer mysterious at all43. But Wolff’s insistence on the necessity 
to reveal the real paternity of the work was not his only intervention in the final 
draft of the review. Wolff’s general ideas on La Mettrie were to influence a big 
part of the German scene. The Neue theologische Bibliothek edited by the Göt-
40 Gottingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen, December 1747 (zweyte Zugabe), pp. 905-907: using 
a very common topic, the anonymous reviewer denounced that kind of philosophy which fits the demands 
of sensitivity, but not those of the intellect; indeed any intellectual approach would refuse to consider the 
activity of thought in its various manifestations as something that can be reduced to mere mechanical 
movements (mechanische Bewegungen) in the brain, or in some other physical component of the body. The 
reviewer doesn’t seem to be Haller; actually the Göttingische Zeitungen had already published a review of 
the Histoire naturelle de l’âme (June 26 1747, pp. 413-416). On the polemic between Haller and La Mettrie 
in that journal cf. KNABE, Die Rezeption der französischen Aufklärung cit., pp. 121-148.
41 Nachrichten von einer hallischen Bibliothek, 1 (January 3, 1748), pp. 75-84.
42 Nachrichten von einer hallischen Bibliothek, 1 (January 30 1748), p. 82. 
43 Nevertheless there was still some caution in revealing the true identity of the author; cf. Göttingische 
Zeitungen von Gelehrten Sachen, March 25 1748, pp. 260-262: “Er ist weder ein Schweizer, noch ein 
Freund, noch ein Zuhörer des Hrn. Hallers. Wir getrauen uns zu versichern, daß er ein Franzose und mit 
Hrn. H. niemahls in der geringsten Bekanntschaft gestanden ist. Das Buch ist im Haag und in Leiden nach 
Würden verbrannt, und der vermessene Verleger mit einer starken Geldstrafe belegt worden. Wir wissen 
des Verfassers itzige Umstände, und den Ort seines Aufenthalts ganz wohl, finden aber wichtige Ursachen 
denselben nicht bekannt zu machen“. Two months later, in May, the Neue theologische Bibliothek edited 
by the theologian and university preacher in Göttingen Friedrich Wilhelm Kraft (1712-1758) presented 
the essay as the work of a certain “de la M*” (Neue theologische Bibliothek, 21 [May 1748], pp. 68-70).
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tingen theologian Friedrich Wilhelm Kraft (1712-1758) rejected for instance the 
idea that the only difference between humans and animals lay in the different 
degree of organization of their matter (p. 69); but also the idea that thought could 
be explained in terms of motion, that the mind could be reduced to the body, and 
that one should accept that form of materialism, with its denial of the existence of 
God and of divine providence. Quoting Baumgarten, Kraft claimed that accord-
ing to La Mettrie “human beings are scattered on the earth like mushrooms with 
no grounds nor aim, and it makes no difference to them if God exists or not”44. 
And it was just after one year that Wolff’s judgment on the on the book definitely 
prevailed over the other possible interpretations, preventing any other reading 
of L’Homme machine from that which recognized in it a form of the classical 
materialism à la Hobbes. 
In 1749 the Göttingische philosophische Bibliothek published the first com-
plete review of the debate initiated by the publication of L’Homme machine45. 
The journal was directed by Christian Ernst von Windheim (1722-1766), a tal-
ented young philosopher who completed his education in Halle with Christian 
Wolff and got the title of Magister in 1745 under the supervision of the young 
Baumgarten. Being an active member of the intellectual life of the Prussian town, 
Windheim was in contact with a group of people (among them: Georg Friedrich 
Meier, Joachim Lange, Johann Friedrich Stiebritz, Johann Gottlob Krüger) who 
were providing a sort of renovation of Wolffianism by means of issues they derived 
from the theological sphere of the Pietists, from Christian Thomasius’s eclectic 
tradition, and even from the empirical and experimental method of natural and 
medical sciences. Once he got his professorship first in Göttingen, then in Er-
langen, Windheim retained his proximity to his philosophical roots: he based his 
Logic classes on Wolff’s handbook, and his Metaphysics ones on Baumgarten’s 
treatise. Being an extremely prolific author, deeply engaged in the circulation of 
knowledge, in 1749 he began the publication of the Göttingische philosophische 
44 Neue theologische Bibliothek, 21 (May 1748), pp. 68-70; Baumgarten’s quotation is taken from the 
first issue of the Nachrichten von einer hallischer Bibliothek, 1 (1748), p. 80. As C.T. Wolfe suggests the 
image of human beings scattered on the earth like mushrooms was presented as a clear sign of atheistic 
ideas also in Bentley’s (much-read) Boyle’s Lecture from the late 17th c. (R. BENTLEY, The Folly of Atheism, 
and (what is now called) Deism, even with respect to the present life, Sermon I [1691], in Sermons preached 
at Boyle’s lectures, in ID., The works of Richard Bentley, vol. III: Theological writings, Macpherson, London 
1838, pp. 8-9: “Now let us suppose some great professor in Atheism to suggest to some of these men, that 
all this is mere dream and imposture; that there is no such excellent Being, as they suppose, that created 
and preserves them; that all about them is dark senseless matter, driven on by blind impulses of fatality 
and fortune; that men first sprung up, like mushrooms, out of the mud and slime of the earth; and that 
all their thoughts, and the whole of what they call soul, are only various action and repercussion of small 
particles of matter, kept awhile a-moving by some mechanism and clock-work, which finally must cease 
and perish by death”). The circulation of the Boyle’s lectures among the theologians in Halle still deserves 
an autonomous investigation.
45 Göttingische Philosophische Bibliothek, 3 (1749), pp. 198-273.
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Bibliothek (in 8 volumes between 1749 and 1757), which collected reviews, ex-
tracts, and comments on the national and international philosophical news. The 
first volume began with a discussion of L’Homme machine46.
The deep influence of Wolff-Bel’s review is evident from the very first lines of 
Windheim’s discussion, which recalled some of its formulas almost literally. The 
author of the “despicable writing” aims at “defending materialism by means of 
warmed-over pretexts that he put in a new French sauce in order to make them 
seem more tasty; and at refuting the existence of God and the persistence of 
the soul after death”47. La Mettrie carries on his project presenting once again 
the apology of materialism already presented in the Histoire de l’âme. Beside 
offering a general view on the large debate that sprouted up in just one year 
due to La Mettrie’s scandalous work, Windheim’s review played a central role 
in the German reception of L’Homme machine in so far it – through an accurate 
selection of polemical writings – transmitted to the readers an image of the work 
filtered by Wolff’s ‘prejudice’, unable to recognize what was ‘new’ in La Mettrie’s 
materialism, and what made it incomparable with the earlier mechanistic ma-
terialism. The fortune of that image was huge. In 1774, for instance, Hennings 
still referred to Windheim’s review in his successful Geschichte der Seelen, one 
of the most read and plundered works in the history of psychology48.
The review opened with L’Homme plus que Machine, the notorious reply of the 
Dutch publisher Elie Luzac49 who belonged to the circle of liberal Protestants of 
the République des Lettres, inspired by the perpetual Secretary of the Academy 
of Sciences in Berlin Jean Henry Samuel Formey, and therefore close to Wolff’s 
46 Another proof of his deep interest in cultural dissemination is his further project, the Bemühungen 
der Weltweisen vom Jahr 1700-1750; oder Nachrichten und Auszüge von ihren Schriften, sonderlich den 
ausländischen, theils selbst verfasst, theils aus den berühmtesten Monatsschriften gesammlet, that he would 
publish from 1751 to 1754. On Windheim cf. in general P. TSCHACKERT, ad voc. “Windheim, Christan Ernst 
von”, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (ADB), vol. 43, Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig 1898, pp. 388-390; 
H. DOERING, Die gelehrten Theologen Deutschlands im achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhundert, Karl 
Gottfried Wagner, Neustadt an der Orla 1835, vol. 4, p. 726.
47 “Den Materialismus durch aufgewärmte Scheingründe, die er durch eine französiche Brühe 
schmackhaft gemacht hat, zu vertheidigen, die Wirklichkeit Gottes, und die Fortdauer der Seele nach 
dem Tode zu bestreiten”: Göttingische Philosophische Bibliothek, 3 (1749), p. 197 (henceforth WINDHEIM); 
Windheim announces the publication of an English translation of the book, in which it was considered 
a work by the Marquis d’Argens: Man a Machine, translated from the French of the Marques d’Argens (p. 
198).
48 J.Ch. HENNINGS, Geschichte von den Seelen der Menschen und Thiere pragmatisch entworfen, Gebauer, 
Halle 1774, pp. 22–23 fn. Windheim’s selection doesn’t seem especially tendentious since it is very 
hard to find refutations or defences of L’Homme machine in the anti-Wolffian milieu. Euler’s Enodatio 
quaestionis: utrum materiae facultas cogitandi tribuit possit nec ne? – maybe one of the best refutations of 
materialism from an anti-Wolffian point of view – appears only in 1746.
49 L’Homme plus que Machine (1748), in WINDHEIM, pp. 198-216. On Luzac’s role in the République 
des Lettres cf. J.Ch. LAURSEN / J. VAN DER ZANDE (eds.), Early French and German defenses of freedom of 
the press: Elie Luzac’s essay on Freedom of expression, 1749 and Carl Friedrich Bahrdt’s On freedom of the 
press and its limits, 1787 in English translation, Brill, Leiden 2003, pp. 9-34.
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rationalism. It followed the Lettre d’un Anonyme pour servir de Critique ou de 
Refutation, au livre intitulé l’Homme machine, anonymously published in the 
Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen50 by Samuel Christian Hollmann, 
a Cartesian and opponent of Wolffianism, but nevertheless a sympathizer with 
the materialism of those physicians like Urban Gottfried Bucher who referred to 
Descartes’s Les passions de l’âme and to Hobbes’s De corpore as the main sources 
of inspiration of their ideas about the nature of human beings. Indeed Hollmann 
stressed that the Maschinenmensch displayed the same philosophical structure 
as Bucher’s Vertrauter Brief-Wechsel vom Wesen der Seelen, so that the two works 
were “like two peas in a pod”51. Hollmann’s Lettre had the merit to provoke La 
Mettrie’s reaction: the Epitre a mon Esprit ou l’Anonyme persiflé was then the 
third text Windheim presented in a long extract in order to show that “the Ma-
chine hadn’t yet corrected its way of thinking”52. These polemical writings were 
followed by those texts which are still nowadays considered the main products 
of the German reaction to La Mettrie. First of all the Commentatio de machina et 
anima humana prorsus a se invicem distinctis by the Breslau physician Balthasar 
Ludwig Tralles, who aimed at avenging the honor and dignity of his discipline 
by contesting L’Homme machine from the point of view of medicine. With an 
explicit reference to Wolff’s ideas, he claimed that medicine didn’t lead directly 
to materialism, being on the contrary the best way to consider the complex nature 
of human beings53. Beside that, Windheim dealt with Adam Wilhelm Franzen’s 
Widerlegung der Französischen Schrift: L’Homme machine, nebst dem Beweiß der 
50 Lettre d’un Anonyme pour servir de Critique ou de Refutation, au livre intitulé l’Homme machine 
(March 31 1748), in Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen, May 1748.
51 Hollmann was a curious character who started his philosophical career in Greifswald (1722) and 
in Wittenberg (1723) during the worst years of the controvery between Wolff and the Pietists. Afterwards 
Münchhausen called him at the Georgia Augusta in Göttingen, but just once Wolff had definitely rejected 
that same offer. On Hollmann cf. U. THIEL, ad voc. “Hollmann, Samuel Christian”, in H. KLEMME / M. 
KUEHN (eds.), Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers, Bloomsbury Academic, New York 
2010 (who considers him to be closer to Wolff’s positions than I do here). K. CRAMER, Die Stunde der 
Philosophie. Über Göttingens ersten Philosophen und die philosophische Theorielage der Gründungszeit, 
in J. VON STACKELBERG (ed.), Zur geistigen Situation der Zeit der Göttinger Universitätsgründung 1737: 
eine Vortragsreihe aus Anlass des 250 jährigen Bestehens der Georgia Augusta, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
Göttingen 1988, pp. 101-143; on his autorship of the review cf. J.G. ZIMMERMANN, Das Leben des Herrn 
Hallers, Heidegger und Compagnie, Zürich 1755; the mentioned text is [U.G. BUCHER], Zweyer guten 
Freunde vertrauter Brief-Wechsel vom Wesen der Seelen, Haag [but Leipzig and Jena] 1713, 17232; Holl-
mann suggested that L’Homme machine be considered a free translation of that correspondence. 
52 Epitre a mon Esprit. Ou l’Anonyme persifle (1749), in WINDHEIM, pp. 247-254. The text was origi-
nally published in S.J. Baumgarten’s Nachrichten von einer hallischen Bibliothek, 14 (1748), pp. 179-186.
53 Commentatio de machina et anima humana prorsus a se invicem distinctis (1749), in WINDHEIM, 
pp. 216-236. Referring to Tralles F.A. LANGE’s Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung 
in der Gegenwart, Baedecker, Iserlohn 1873-1875, cap. IV, p. 414, claims that “In allen Hauptpunkten 
sind es freilich die landläufigen, der Wolffschen Philosophie entlehnten Beweise, die auch hier überall 
wiederkehren”.
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Gegensätze54, a work that offers a further confirmation of Wolff’s influence on 
the early reception of La Mettrie, even though it clearly shows some speculative 
weakness that lead Aram Vartanian to include it among the “weakest rejoinders 
to L’Homme machine” since it “substituted religious dogmas for philosophical 
arguments”55. 
All the mentioned writings, and each from its peculiar point of view, contrib-
ute to the general picture of Wolff’s refutation of materialism, focused on the ref-
utation of the hypothesis of a materia cogitans. Luzac’s piece mentioned Wolff’s 
arguments in their proper order, focusing on the opposition between activity 
and passivity, i.e. between composition and simplicity. “Indubitable experiences 
show that matter is passive, or that resting matter cannot start moving without 
the intervention of an external principle” (p. 200); movement cannot represent 
the origin of thought, since otherwise “cannonballs and bombs should be able 
to think as well” (p. 202). Beside that, if thought was the property of extended 
substance one should then face the old problem concerning its possible dispo-
sition among the parts of the compound: either it should be fragmented in them 
– with the consequence of missing the essential unity of thought – or it should 
be multiplied in vain in each single part of the body (p. 204).
While this refutation was based on a traditional metaphysical dualism, the 
Lettre d’un Anonyme pour servir de Critique ou de Refutation, au livre intitulé 
l’Homme machine56 stressed another central item of Wolff’s denial of material-
ism, i.e. consciousness. In fact Wolff claimed that conscience (Bewußtsein) was 
an essential component of thought: ‘thinking’ and ‘being conscious’ have for him 
one and the same meaning: “when we pay attention to our soul we perceive that 
we are conscious of ourselves, and of many external things. When it happens 
we say we are thinking, therefore we call thoughts the modifications of the soul 
it is conscious of”57.
According to Wolff, consciousness was a prerogative of simple beings, since 
no compound would ever be able to compare its own modifications in order to 
conceive them as distinct and as something different from itself58. Neither in 
54 Widerlegung der Französischen Schrift: l’Homme machine, nebst dem Beweiß der Gegensätze (1749), 
in WINDHEIM, pp. 254-273.
55 VARTANIAN, La Mettrie’s l’Homme Machine cit., p. 99.
56 The Lettre d’un Anonyme pour servir de Critique ou de Refutation, au livre intitulé l’Homme machine 
cit., had the merit of provoking a reply by La Mettrie (who probably didn’t read German). He replied with 
the Epitre a mon Esprit ou l’Anonyme persifle (WINDHEIM, pp. 236-247). The French letter is the translation 
of the one published in the Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sache, 52 (1748) and 54 (1748). 
57 WOLFF, Deutsche Metaphysik cit., § 194, and §§ 193, 195.
58 WOLFF, Deutsche Metaphysik cit., § 740; ID., Psychologia rationalis cit., § 90. On the difference 
between representations in the soul and in physical bodies cf. P. RUMORE, Die Bilder der Seele. Vorstellung 
und Einheit, in L. CATALDI MADONNA (ed.), Macht und Bescheidenheit der Vernunft. Beiträge zur Philosophie 
Christian Wolffs, Olms, Hildesheim 2005, pp. 111-122.
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those cases which we understand intuitively as most similar to the representa-
tive activity of the soul – viz. mimetic representations, images in mirrors, or any 
kind of reproductions in a machine – material representations never cease being 
repraesentationes compositi in composito and become repraesentationes compositi 
in simplici, i.e. thoughts59. 
In the Lettre Hollmann admitted his early inclination towards materialism, 
even though the arguments in favor of the materiality of the soul never man-
aged to convince him at all (pp. 237-240). Being trapped in their mechanical 
explanations, materialists failed in their attempt to account for the undeniable 
phenomenon of consciousness, and of the spontaneity of the subject of thought: 
they failed to explain how “in all those mechanical operations we are conscious 
of ourselves, and of what was going on in us, and how can there in us be a ca-
pacity to produce spontaneous movement” (p. 239). Descartes himself, the real 
inspirer of the image of the man-machine, seduced by the idea of the general 
mechanical explanation of the world, was nevertheless compelled to find some 
place for consciousness and spontaneous movements within his system60. Holl-
mann’s philosophical summa, De stupendo naturae mysterio, anima humana sibi 
ipsi ignota, rejected the idea that the soul has an immediate awareness of its 
own essence as an immaterial substance. On the contrary, it derived this kind of 
knowledge by means of discursive reasoning from the nature of its operations. 
Nevertheless the soul gained a kind of immediate self-knowledge: it knows it is 
a substance (therefore Hollmann was radically anti-Spinozist)61, which differs 
from the body (anti-reductionism)62. Understanding the soul as the result of 
the body’s physiological processes, and denying its substantial nature L’Homme 
machine contested in fact precisely these cornerstones, and revealed its direct 
Spinozistic legacy, according to this interpretation: “At the end of his book he 
doesn’t hide the fact that he is a Spinozist”; “according to me a Spinozist is a 
miserable and confused man, which should be pitied, and which one should 
try and help, if still possible, by introducing to him a couple of not-too-tricky 
remarks from logic, a clear explanation of what ‘one’ and ‘many’ mean, and what 
59 WOLFF, Psychologia rationalis cit., §§ 83 e 87; ID., Deutsche Metaphysik cit., § 217, §§ 738-740, 
and § 751.
60 Cf. WINDHEIM, p. 243. 
61 WINDHEIM, p. 235: “Laßt uns nun ganz kühn schliessen, spricht er, daß der Mensch eine Maschine, 
und daß nur eine einzige Substanz in der Welt sey, die verschieden modificirt ist. Wie leichte läßt sichs 
einem Spinoza bloß naschsprechen?”.
62 Even if close to Cartesianism Hollmann has a polemical attitude towards some aspects of Des-
cartes’s dualism that seems to be influenced by Malebranche. It concerns mostly the idea of a ‘privileged 
way’ to access the the knowledge of the nature of the soul. In his De stupendo naturae mysterio, anima 
humana sibi ipsi ignota (Greifswald 1722, Wittenberg 17232; Göttingen 1750) he claims that the soul 
doesn’t know itself better than it knows other substances: “ignorantia crassa est, qua mens nostra in sua 
ipsius cognitione laborat” (ed. 1750, p. 8). 
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kind of thing is a substance. Who has distinct concepts of those things, and is 
free from any prejudice will be ashamed if he spent even a quarter of an hour 
worring about the confused ideas of a Spinozist” (pp. 244–245).
Consciousness, and the impossibility to explain its processes by means of 
mechanical laws represented for Hollmann the real defeat of materialism; facing 
this difficulty – as already stressed by Baumgarten – “reasonable physicians 
know they won’t be able for a long time yet to explain every modification that 
occurs in the human body, or to make their causes clear and comprehensible, 
their art being still very far away from a plain degree of certainty and evidence” 
(pp. 83-84). Similarly Tralles vindicated the so called mechanische Ärzte (p. 
218) – like Schreiber (Wolff’s young compatriot63), Hoffmann, Boerhaave, and 
those who explained the functioning of human body be means of its mechanical 
structure – from the accusation of complicity with La Mettrie, resulting from his 
own naming of them as guardians of his mistakes. According to Tralles, those 
physicians never believed they could or wish to “explain everything going on in 
this small world through the world itself”; “in particular in their last days they 
were all deeply persuaded that the soul is completely different from the body, 
and grounded in this idea their tranquility in front of death, and their hope in 
an eternal beatitude” (p. 218). In this way Tralles averted the threat of tying 
the destiny of the physician to that of the materialist; he explicitly presented 
his Commentatio as a defense of “the honor of religion, and [of] the innocence 
of medicine” – and of Haller’s in first place, a very recurring topic within that 
debate on L’Homme machine; Tralles suggested to La Mettrie to study both of 
Wolff’s two Latin treatises on psychology (p. 221). “How could the H.M. manage 
to explain on the basis of the brain the freedom of thinking, the rapidity of judg-
ment, abstraction, and other logical operations? He shows us and teaches that 
the most artificial machine can think. One hopes he won’t seek to appeal to the 
obscure ways of the occult qualities [as a solution]. How will he at last explain 
the moral human being in mechanical terms?” (p. 222).
Tralles’s arguments were the arguments of a physician who had a good phil-
osophical (Wolffian) education too: he was very careful not to deduce more than 
a generic connection of physical and psychical processes from their empirical 
coexistence, nor the existence of an Author of nature and its finalistic orientation 
from the perfect integration of the corporeal organs, and their functions64; he did 
63 Cf. WOLFF, Wie die Arzneykunst nach einer beweisenden Lehrart eingerichtet werden könne (1731), 
in Kleine philosophische Schriften I cit., pp. 689-690, originally published as preface of J.F. SCHREIBER’s 
Elementa medicinae physico-mathematica.
64 WINDHEIM, p. 224: “Aber wie leicht könnte er sich nicht davon durch eine genau Betrachtung des 
geringsten Gliedes seines eigenen Körpers überführen, wenn er nur nicht mit dem unglücklichen Spinoza 
die weisen Absichten, um welcher willen unser Körper mit Fleiß so und nicht anders ist gemacht worden, 
leugnete, und auf die fatale Nothwendigkeit in der Natur drünge”.
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not conclude from the identical anatomy of human and animal brains that the 
soul reduces to the brain, but rather the idea that many of the cerebral functions 
are still unknown, and that it is therefore hasty to endow the brain with the fac-
ulty of thought (p. 220). Far from considering it a mere product of blind chance, 
Tralles also includes the fact that animals have no language in the wider project 
of the best possible world, according to which they were not provided with the in-
struments suitable to speak. Being himself a physician, Tralles was one of the few 
critics who took seriously into account La Mettrie’s idea that each corporeal (i.e. 
material) fiber might be endowed with an internal active principle. Tralles con-
sidered such a force nothing but a vis motrix; even if movement might originate 
directly in the nerves, it does not explain how it could ever produce sensations, 
affections or ideas, i.e. to overcome the radical heterogeneity between thought 
and movement, between the activities that originate in the soul and those which 
occur within matter65. “Resting on a precise knowledge of the human body and 
of its mechanical laws, true medicine does not promote an erroneous idea of the 
human soul”, viz. the knowledge of the so called medici mechanici (iatromechan-
ical psysicians) doesn’t automatically lead them to materialistic positions66. This 
remark on Tralles’s Commentatio opened the Widerlegung by Franzen, who had 
already published a Kritische Geschichte der Lehre der Unsterblichkeit der Seele 
(Lübeck 1747) where he proved to be a committed advocate of the immateriality 
of the soul, and of its immortality67. Franzen’s Widerlegung appeared shortly af-
ter Tralles’s refutation, which it is close to in many aspects, even though Franzen 
had no occasion to read Tralles’s work before the publication of his own68. The 
affinities between the two writings go back to their common source of inspiration, 
which works as a general framework both for Tralles, whose analyses are more 
65 This argument is also used in his other successful work De animae existentis immaterialitate et 
immortalitate cogitata (Breßlau, 1774), which had an exceptionally wide circulation. Indeed it was first 
translated into German by Tralles himself under the title Gedancken über das Daseyn, die Immaterialität 
und Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele (Göttingen, 1776), and then also into French as Pensées de 
l’immatérialité et de l’éxistence de l’âme (Vienna, 1775, also published as Pensées sur l’éxistence et de 
l’immaterialité de l’âme, Vienna, 1776), and into Italian (Considerazioni del signor Baldassarre Lodovico 
Tralles consigliere ed archiatro […] sopra l’immortalità e spiritualità dell’anima esistente, Firenze 1780).
66 Cf. the defense of iatromechanism in WOLFF, Epistula gratulatoria in qua Vera philosophiae me-
chanicae notio explicantur (1710), in ID., Meletemata mathematico-philosophica (1755), Num. II, Olms, 
Hildesheim 2003. Here (p. 730) Wolffs explains that the expressions philosophia mechanica / mechanisch 
philosophieren indicate the bare explanation of phenomena on the basis of the natural laws of motion. 
“In this sense natural (as well as artificial) bodies are called machines: their actions derive indeed from 
the composition and interction of their parts according to eternal and immutable natural laws”. Mecha-
nism is not dangerous in itself: by means of the mechanical explanations one can grasp “the imprint of 
God’s wisdom in the world” (WOLFF, Ausführliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schrifften [1726], Olms, 
Hildesheim 1996, p. 237).
67 A.W. FRANZEN, Widerlegung der Französischen Schrift: l’Homme machine, nebst dem Beweiß der 
Gegensätze, Jacobi, Leipzig 1749, Vorrede, p. 2*; cf. the discussion in WINDHEIM, pp. 254-273.
68 FRANZEN, Widerlegung der Französischen Schrift cit., Vorrede, p. 3*.
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inspired by natural sciences and medicine, and for Franzen who recalls instead 
theological and metaphysical arguments69. Beside the theological argument con-
cerning the truth of revelation – whose refutation was for Franzen one of the 
strongholds of his polemic against L’Homme machine – his original contribution 
to the debate is to be found in the analysis and refutation of La Mettrie’s idea 
of matter, according to which every single material part contains an internal 
principle of movement ruled by the brain, and responsible for the production of 
sensations and thoughts. This was how La Mettrie was able to “present in a new 
decoration (ausschmucken) the old belief of man and animals as machines” (§ 
99, p. 309). Franzen’s refutation developed on two different levels. The first con-
cerned the movements that take place in the body: even though those movements 
originated in an internal principle of the corporeal components, they are not all 
of the same kind, some of them being voluntary, while others are involuntary. 
One could only admit that the latter derive from the mechanism of the body, but 
not the former, so that in conclusion it turned out to be unfeasible to admit only 
one principle for all movements. In order to justify spontaneous motions one was 
compelled to turn to the presence of a soul which evades the mechanical laws of 
bodies. Supposing that matter is active – by means of the principle of irritability 
or of some kind of sensitivity – this activity could never be a spontaneous one, 
but again a form of mechanical movement. For this reason – and here is the 
second level of the refutation  – Franzen didn’t admit any reduction of thought 
and sensations to such an internal active principle in matter (§ 72) on the basis 
of the divide between the deterministic realm of bodies, and the spontaneous 
realm of souls. But this second refutation followed Wolff’s model of dualism, 
which differed from Descartes’s: in the 5th section of his Widerlegung Franzen 
introduced in fact a sharp critique of the idea of the animal-machine along the 
same lines as Wolff’s German Metaphysics, and Georg Friedrich Meier’s Versuch 
eines neuen Lehrgebäudes von den Seelen der Thiere (Halle 1749), both well dis-
posed to concede animals a soul, even though less perfect than the human one70.
Franzen’s Widerlegung recognised in some ways La Mettrie’s innovations in 
the field of materialism, but he denied firmly the plausibility of these ideas: more 
than as a worthy hypothesis, this doctrine was presented here as the boutade 
69 FRANZEN, Widerlegung der Französischen Schrift cit., Vorrede, pp. 2*-3*: “Mr Luzac had no other 
aim than to proof that matter cannot think, and to refute the main consequences that materialists derive 
from their mistake, without discussing every and each apparent reasons of our opponents. [...] Mr Tralles 
wanted mainly to show that true medicine which is grounded on a precise knowledge of the human body 
and of its mechanical laws, doesn’t favor any wrong thoughts about the human soul at all. [...] In theology 
and philosophy I still found something to add, even though, as concerns some observations related to 
anatomy, I explicitly referred to him, and for this help I am grateful”.
70 FRANZEN, Widerlegung der Französischen Schrift cit., § 107; cf. WOLFF, Deutsche Metaphysik cit., 
§ 830, §§ 869-897.
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of an insolent physician who was not familiar at all with the grounds of good 
metaphysics. Following the same conviction Windheim skipped this topic in his 
review of the Widerlegung, focusing rather on its old Wolffian legacy: the irreduc-
ibility of thought and movement, the exceptional phenomenon of consciousness, 
the heterogeneity between the two ontological realms beyond the concurrence 
of their modifications. 
All these refutations were articulated in two main ideas: the opposition of 
thought and matter based on the opposition between activity and passivity; and 
the phenomenon of consciousness, which marks the difference between the 
proper idea, the imago mentalis and any imago materialis71. At the basis of this 
refutation was Wolff’s general claim concerning the necessity and knowability of 
real essences against Locke’s metaphysical caution, as well as Wolff’s diffidence 
towards the validity of the harmonic principle among the substances, whose 
denial didn’t lead directly, by the way, neither to the possibility of a reduction of 
the mind to the organization of the body, nor to their homogeneous metaphysical 
nature. In this way the refutations disseminated a clearly maimed image of La 
Mettrie’s materialism, which will soon crystallize in German philosophy; its ori-
gins went back first and foremost to the idea of materialism Wolff had developed 
by then 20 years earlier during his controversies with Buddeus, but are also 
the product of a massive cultural strategy which guaranteed their hegemonic 
dissemination. The image of La Mettrie as a continuator of Hobbes’ mechanistic 
materialism then spread its long-lasting influence, and one can find it in Eul-
er – who conceived the man-machine as an expression of the same mechanical 
system of the puppet-theatre that was also the basis of (Wolff’s) preestabilished 
harmony72 – in Gottfried Ploucquet73, in Spalding, in Kant, which then allowed 
the new generation of young thinkers in the 1770s to inaugurate in Germany a 
new materialistic trend now presented in a novel hylomorphic guise.
71 Cf. WOLFF, Psychologia rationalis, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima huma-
na indubia experientiae fide innotescunt, per essentiam et naturam animae explicantur, et ad intimiorem 
naturae ejusque auctoris cognitionem pro futura proponentur, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1734, reprint. ed. 
1740 Olms, Hildesheim 1972, §§ 83, 87, and §§ 113-114; Deutsche Metaphysik cit., § 751; P. RUMORE, 
Die Bilder der Seele. Vorstellung und Einheit, in CATALDI MADONNA (ed.), Macht und Bescheidenheit der 
Vernunft cit., pp. 111-122.
72 Cf. L. EULER, Briefe an eine deutsche Prinzessin über verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Physik und 
Philosophie, written during his last years in Berlin (1760-1762), but published only between 1768 (vols. 
1-2) and 1772 (vol. 3) with the financial support of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. Letter nr. 
84 makes an explicit reference to the “puppeteer-marionette relation”. 
73 G. PLOUCQUET, Dissertatio de materialismo, cum supplementis et confutatione libelli: L’Homme ma-
chine, Erhardt, Tübingen 1751. 
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Nichts ist gewisser, als dass Vernunft und 
Erfahrung die beyden Grundsäulen aller 
menschlichen Erkänntniß sind.
J.G. KRÜGER, Experimental-Seelenlehre, § 2
1.  Experiment und Metaphysik – Krüger als Wolffianer?
Im Jahre 1760 veröffentlicht ein noch unbekannter Privatdozent der Philoso-
phie in Bützlow, einer Auslagerung der Universität Rostock1, einen moderat 
metaphysik-kritischen Text, hier heißt es:
„So ist sie [d. i. die Metaphysik] von dem Freiherrn von Wolff eingerichtet, den man 
nach der Prophezeiung eines grossen Mannes alsdenn noch mit Hochachtung nen-
nen wird, wenn die mehresten seiner Verächter schon längstens werden vergessen 
sein; und ich sehe keinen hinreichenden Grund hievon abzugehen, die Experimen-
tal-Seelenlehre von ihr zu trennen“2.
Niemand anderes als Johann Nikolaus Tetens, in den 1770er Jahren sel-
ber einer der bedeutendsten empirischen Psychologen Europas, stellt hier mit 
Nachdruck fest, dass er alle Versuche zu einer metaphysikfreien, rein experi-
mentellen Psychologie für unmöglich, insbesondere aber jene Experimental-
Seelenlehre, die sein Helmstedter Kollege Johann Gottlob Krüger vier Jahre 
zuvor der Öffentlichkeit vorgelegt hatte3, für haltlos erachtet. Eine vollständige 
Abtrennung der Psychologie von der Metaphysik hält Tetens 1760 für gänzlich 
unmöglich. Diese Auffassung wird sich in den kommenden Jahren nur gering-
1 Vgl. hierzu G. CAMENZ, Die Herzoglichen Friedrichs-Universität und Paedagogium zu Bützow in 
Mecklenburg 1760-1789, Gäusebrunnen-Verlag, Bützow 2004.
2 J.N. TETENS, Gedancken über einige Ursachen, warum in der Metaphysik nur wenige ausgemachte 
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